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Duplicity(s) of the sign in question  
Introduction 
Élodie Blestel1, Chrystelle Fortineau-Brémond2 & Marine Poirier3  
Abstract 
Is the linguistic sign, traditionally conceived as a symbol (from the Greek sym + bol 
‘putting two faces together’), diabolical (from the Greek dia 'to separate')? That is the 
question arised by this second issue of Signifiances (Signifying), which proposes 
questioning the duplicity or, more exactly, the duplicities of the sign. The articles presented 
emanate from researchers from various theoretical horizons; but the studies gathered here 
bear witness to the same concern: the desire to question, to challenge, what is usually 
considered as given. All the terms of the definition of the sign as an arbitrary union of a 
signifier and a signified, symbolizing a portion of reality, are here questioned, each paper 
being particularly interested in this or that aspect of this conception. The elements of the 
definition are not seen as objects with a positive existence but rather as dynamic processes 
(speaker experience) or as the result of constitutive points of view of linguistic entities 
(biased linguist), and most of the contributions are based on the signifier as a dynamic 
process. 
Keywords: Symbol vs. Dia-bolical ; duplicities of the linguistic sign ; experience ; dynamic 
process. 
Résumé 
Le signe linguistique, traditionnellement conçu comme un symbole (du grec sym + bole 
‘mettre ensemble deux faces’), ne serait-il pas diabolique (du grec dia ‘séparer’) ? Telle 
est la question que pose ce numéro 2 de Signifiances (Signifying), qui se penche sur la 
duplicité ou, plus exactement, les duplicités du signe. Les travaux présentés émanent de 
chercheurs d’horizons théoriques divers ; mais les études réunies ici témoignent d’une 
même préoccupation : la volonté de questionner, de remettre en cause, ce qui est 
habituellement considéré comme relevant du donné. Tous les termes de la définition du 
signe comme union arbitraire d’un signifiant et d’un signifié, symbolisant une portion du 
réel, sont ici interrogés, chaque article s’intéressant plus particulièrement à tel ou tel 
aspect de cette conception. Les éléments de la définition ne sont pas envisagés comme des 
objets ayant une existence positive mais plutôt comme des processus dynamiques 
(expérience du locuteur) ou comme le résultat de points de vue constitutifs des entités 
linguistiques (parti pris du linguiste), et la plupart des contributions ont pour point de 
départ le signifiant en tant que processus dynamique. 
Mots-clés : Sym-bolique vs. Dia-bolique ; duplicités du signe linguistique ; expérience ; 
proccessus dynamique.  
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The linguistic sign is one of the varieties of the symbol. 
Saussure's definition, a combination of a concept called 
signified, and an acoustic image called signifier, is the most 
generally accepted.4 
(Mounin, 1974, s.v. « sign ». Authors’ translation) 
 
Is the linguistic sign, traditionally conceived as a symbol (from the Greek sym + bol ‘putting 
two faces together’), diabolical (from the Greek dia 'to separate')? The question arises in more 
than one way. 
Western thought is largely dominated by an approach that is defined as scientific and rational, 
and which postulates that the human individual himself is a preconstructed intelligent subject5 
gifted with a central brain whose activity consists of representing the external world,  the latter 
being thought to be given once and for all. 
From a linguistic point of view, this dominant perspective, especially when it is not framed as 
an epistemologic paradigm that can be confronted with possible alternatives, naturally leads to 
the conception of any linguistic sign as the symbol of a reality considered as a basic fact. Thus, 
natural languages do not escape this type of analysis, and are assimilated with formal languages 
in which the signs symbolize pre-existing realities, and combine with each other on a syntactic 
level. A recent alternative in cognitive science6 – the enactive paradigm – is inspired by oriental 
philosophies. The latter are more aware of embodiment, are less dualistic, and highlight the 
coupling of life and the environment. The enactive paradigm is particularly illustrated through 
its questioning of the positivist framework: 
One of the most interesting aspects of this alternative in cognitive science is that 
symbols, in their conventional sense, no longer play any role. This implies a radical 
abandonment of the cognitivist principle according to which the physical structure 
of symbols, their form, remains forever separate from what they represent, their 
meaning. This cleavage between form and meaning was the master stroke that gave 
birth to the computational approach, but it was also the cause of a weakness revealed 
by the deeper study of cognitive phenomena: how do symbols acquire their 
meaning? Where does this additional activity come from, an activity that, by 
construction, is not in the cognitive system? (Varela, 2017 : 206)7 
As we can see, several issues emerge from this questioning. First, questioning the computational 
approach of mind and cognition as “manipulation of symbols” naturally raises interrogations 
about the very definition of the linguistic sign. Does the conception of the sign as a symbol, not 
amount to dia-bolizing initially integrated elements: speech acting materially on the conditions 
of perceivability of an environment, and an environment itself modified by speech surrounding 
                                                 
4 « Le signe linguistique est une des variétés du symbole. La définition de Saussure, combinaison d’un concept 
appelé signifié, et d’une image acoustique appelée signifiant, est la plus généralement acceptée ». 
5 The widely held idea that a human being is immediately constituted as a cognitive and social subject is challenged 
by the paradigm of enaction, which instead posits it as the simple agent of a species that is constructed as a subject 
only by its action and its relation to the other. 
6 The enaction paradigm, which derives from a reflection on the very definition of life (Maturana and autopoiesis), 
has been constructed in reaction to that of the computational theory of the mind, whose dominant metaphor (that 
of of the computer) tends to reduce human cognition to the manipulation of symbols. 
7 « L’un des aspects les plus intéressants de cette alternative en sciences cognitives est que les symboles, dans leur 
sens conventionnel, ne jouent plus aucun rôle. Cela implique un abandon radical du principe cognitiviste selon 
lequel la structure physique des symboles, leur forme, reste à jamais séparée de ce qu’ils représentent, leur sens. 
Ce clivage entre forme et sens était le coup de maître qui avait donné naissance à l’approche computationnelle, 
mais il était également la cause d’une faiblesse que révéla l’étude plus approfondie des phénomènes cognitifs : 
comment les symboles acquièrent-ils leur sens ? D’où provient cette activité supplémentaire qui, par construction, 
n’est pas dans le système cognitif ? ». 




it? If the sign is not a symbol, what can it be? What is its role, its place, its nature in the co-
evolution of living human agents in perpetual construction and distinction of themselves as 
subjects, in their interactions with each other and with their environment? How can another 
general approach to cognition lead us to redefine it and according to what methods? 
Secondly, if we conceive of the sign as an element that makes it possible to represent a 
preconstructed external world, if the sign is seen as a form (container) associated with a stylized 
representation of an external referent prior to any relation to an experiencer (content), then the 
sign may continue carrying this split between “form” and “meaning” at its level. In fact, this 
cleavage is regularly referred to as “signifier” and “signified.” What is the “signified” if not a 
representation as understood here? What conceptions of the sign, which vary according the 
definitions of the place and nature of the sign, has linguistics given itself? Should we inevitably 
maintain a separation into two facets? Is this not another form of dia-bolisation, source of a 
certain “duplicity?” This type of duplicity could be misleading with regard to what happens in 
the speakers’ experience of a dynamic signifying in which the (symbolic) units are not clear. In 
addition, it must poorly reflect the functioning of human cognition . 
And finally, as explained by F. Varela in the preceding quote, the symbolic vision of the sign 
obscures the questioning of the way in which the genesis of meaning is played out through the 
sign. In other words, what is excluded when two consubstantially united objects are cleaved is 
the very process by which their union takes place. Indeed, it is the process by which meaning 
emerges through intervention of the form. Because of the original distinction, such a question 
has long remained in the shadows, avoided by a declaration of the union’s arbitrariness. To 
question the cleavage between form and meaning is thus to simultenously focus on the 
construction of meaning and to question the way in which such a divide was born in order to 
think about the sign differently. 
The enactive paradigm is only one framework that makes it possible to question the dominant 
approach and propose a redefinition of the linguistic sign as well as a reflection on the very 
conditions of its constitution. This is the position of the editors of this issue, to which some 
contributors also relate in one way or another – questions about the genesis of the linguistic 
sign, reflections on the way in which the genesis of linguistic meaning is played out by the sign 
bias. But the papers proposed here are not limited to this approach, since we wished to contrast 
different points of view. 
In the preamble that opens this volume, Marine POIRIER lays down the terms of the debate, 
based on an “exemplary fable,” in this case stanzas of a 14th century opus in verse among the 
most famous in Spanish literature, the Libro de Buen Amor, whose difficulty of interpretation 
is staged in the text itself. The famous episode of the “Dispute of the Greeks and Romans” 
proves to be a perfect illustration of some important linguistic principles that are underexploited 
in the traditional analysis: “double contingency” or the ignorance by each of the interlocutors 
of what the sign means for the other; the signified as constructed ex post, resulting from the 
positioning of an outside observer; the double conception of the sign, as representation and as 
embodied action. M. Poirier's careful analysis of this edifying passage leads to an evocation of 
the different forms taken by the duplicity of the linguistic sign; the diabolical character (in the 
etymological sense of the Greek prefix dia ‘to separate’) from the linguistic sign can be 
investigated from a quadruple perspective: 
– signifier / signified distinction; 
– the separation of the sign from the perceivable world, to which it itself belongs; 
– the sign as segmentation of a form in a signifying flow; 




– the differentiation of interlocutative roles and their interaction through the interface that 
constitutes the sign. 
* 
*          * 
This second issue of Signifiances (Signifying) thus proposes questioning the duplicity or, more 
exactly, the duplicities of the sign, since there are indeed several dualities which deserve 
investigation. The articles presented, as we have said, emanate from researchers from various 
theoretical horizons: there is, therefore, not an expression of a single point of view or the 
adherence to the same school of thought; differences of opinion are recognized and nourish 
reflection. But the studies gathered here bear witness to the same concern: the desire to question, 
to challenge, what is usually considered as given. All the terms of the definition of the sign as 
an arbitrary union of a signifier and a signified, symbolizing a portion of reality, are here 
questioned, each paper being particularly interested in this or that aspect of this conception. The 
elements of the definition are not seen as objects with a positive existence but rather as dynamic 
processes (speaker experience) or as the result of constitutive points of view of linguistic entities 
(biased linguist), and most of the contributions are based on the signifier as a dynamic process. 
Starting from the principles of a genetic phenomenology as practiced by the founders of the 
enaction paradigm, Didier BOTTINEAU proposes unraveling the objects “sign” and “word” by 
considering them as products generated by an observer engaged in a relationship with these 
objects. The author then explores the phenomenogenetic process by which the peircian semiotic 
sign and the Saussurian linguistic sign were constructed, and is led to question the sym-bol as a 
sign referring to an external and pre-existing referent. In an enactive perspective, both the sign 
and the experienced world appear as constructs that emerge in the relation with an observer. 
Therefore, all of experienced reality is by definition the fruit of a biosemiotic process, a 
“signifying” operation which makes surroundings meaningful for the agent who observes them. 
It is by the observation of the fruit of such an operation of signifying that the emergent 
symbolisation is likely to appear. 
If the conceptual object that is the linguistic sign is indeed a construct, closely related to the 
positioning of the observer, it is essential to return to the founding texts where the conceptions 
of the sign are developed and which continue to nourish current reflection. Alongside Peirce 
(referred to several times in D. Bottineau’s paper), we must obviously mention Humboldt and 
Saussure. Several contributions propose a reading or a re-reading of the works of these two 
major figures in linguistics, in order to highlight the postulates that underlie them, the originality 
of their propositions or to evoke their reception and their extensions. 
Thus, Anne-Marie CHABROLLE-CERRETINI evokes the central place occupied by the concept 
of the linguistic sign in any approach to language and languages, especially in 
W. von Humboldt (1767-1835), whose work after 1800 evolves towards a reconsideration of 
language as a sign (Trabant, 1992: 67). By insisting on the cardinal stage of the perception of 
the object, Humboldt takes a stand on arbitrariness. He cannot conceive the unity of the 
language with two fixed and inseparable faces. Indeed, if content is united with form, the former 
is not determined because meaning is private to each individuel. Humboldt therefore proposes 
a new approach to the conventional aspect attributable to the unit: for him, there is discussion 
about this shared sense. Interlocution is where this happens. Humboldt thus united the place 
where the community’s experience is constituted, the place where this relation to the world is 
validated, and the place where one accepts the relationship that each individual has with 
language. 




Anne-Gaëlle TOUTAIN, who presents the Saussurian conception of the constitutive duality of 
the sign, shows that in traditional dualism sound / meaning, Saussure opposes a radically 
different duality, between the sound and the sign, i.e between the material sound, and “the group 
sound-meaning.” If Saussure puts forward the constitution of the sign rather than its 
decomposition, it is because the sign cannot be the starting point of the analysis: linguistic 
entities are not pre-existing positive objects, but result from a point of view, which constructs 
them as linguistic objects. This epistemological rupture goes hand in hand with the affirmation 
of a purely differential, negative existence of these entities (concept of value). Moreover, it can 
not be dissociated from language (langue) distinction (activity, play of “purely negative” 
oppositions) / idiom (empirical manifestation, result, effect of language), about which A.-
G. Toutain emphasizes the fundamental nature and proposes replacing the symbolic / diabolical 
opposition. Saussurian theorization of language and langue supposes a plurality of objects and 
results from as many points of view. Therefore, the last part of the paper is interested in 
language in the sense of psychoanalysis. It especially focuses on language in the work of the 
psychoanalyst Alain Manier, whose reflection on psychosis is supported by the proposal of 
Saussure. 
The Saussurian duality “vocal phenomenon as such” / “vocal phenomenon as sign” is also the 
starting point of Arild UTAKER’s paper. This duality marks a break with the traditional 
conception, which posits language as subordinate to thought or to the world. This subordination 
results in an opposition between the sign as a sensory part and what it means or represents. For 
Saussure, the question of the relationship between the physical, the material, and the meaning 
or between the sign and the world is irrelevant; it is based on a misunderstanding because it 
supposes positive entities gifted with a prior existence (ontological presupposition), whereas 
the sign is primarily defined by its relation to other signs. It is intrinsically double because it is 
both sonorous and content. This “irritating duplicity” makes it impossible to grasp. The sign is, 
therefore, the place of a double difference: a heterogeneous difference signfier / signified and a 
homogeneous difference between signs. And it is its negativity (its opposition to other signs) 
that founds it as a sign, and not the connection between a signifier and a signified having a 
separate prior existence. The Saussurian sign is differential, which has the consequence that it 
refers, in the word, to what it is not. A. Utaker concludes that it is therefore neither diabolic nor 
symbolic, because there are no positive entities to dissolve or connect. 
Francis TOLLIS also reflects on Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale. He focuses on the 
future of the inheritance imposed by an academic reading of Saussure. According to this, the 
linguistic sign was represented as a two-headed entity with two facets, inseparable but distinct. 
F. Tollis shows that even if the signifier of linguistic unity seems the least evanescent of its two 
components, it is about the notion of unitary signified, however well-established in the 
reflection on language, that there is debat. Indeed, the author shows how, given its inseparable 
dualism and the ontological perspective to which it predisposes, this notion seems to present at 
least as many disadvantages as advantages. Thus, by examining the approaches of different 
linguists, F. Tollis analyzes the delimitation of the signified, focusing on the question of the 
relation of the sign with its (possible) reference. He criticizes the processes that reify the sign, 
posited as a pre-existing dualistic entity. He contrasts the so-called analytical or fixist 
approaches, which he connects to the reception of the Cours (not necessarily in philological 
terms), with those, dynamic and contextualist, which put highlight the process of semiosis that 
takes place in the discourse. 
The Saussurian doxa is also recalled in Stéphane PAGÈS’ paper, who proposes a critical 
approach to the linguistic sign, in order to bring out what he calls his “monstrous complexity.” 
Defending the idea that the sign is above all the result of the positioning of the analyst, he is 
interested primarily in the sign envisaged from a static point of view and reviews the main 




conceptions that have been given (monadic, dyadic, triadic, for the most classical, with four or 
five elements for some of the most recent ones); he shows in particular that the question of 
relation to the world (i.e. the status of the referent) is a source of confusion, and, therefore, of 
duplicity. A static approach, however, by describing a structure according to the number of 
elements that enter it, does not exhaust the question relative to the constituents of the sign. This 
reifying vision of the sign as a fixed object, given once and for all, conceals the fact that it can 
(must) also be conceived as a dynamic unit, as the product in the making of a “complex 
multifactorial construction.” After evoking the historical and collective dimension (the sign 
inscribed in an evolutionary process that affects all languages), S. Pagès emphasizes above all 
the biological and individual dimension of the linguistic sign: it is the product of an 
apprenticeship (field of language acquisition) and mobilizes “complex physiological 
mechanisms underpinned by a cognitive and sensorimotor dimension.” If the sign is diabolical, 
it is above all because of the complexity of the signifying mechanics. 
As for Federico BRAVO, he confronts the hypothesis of anagrams and the principle of the 
linguistic sign as a “two-sided psychic entity.” He thus questions what becomes of the signified 
in Saussure's work on anagrams, paying particular attention to the “theme-word,” that is to say 
the name whose phonic paraphrase is essential as constraint to the poet, the anagrammatized 
name. In the choice of the term “theme” to designate a form and not a content, F. Bravo sees a 
reversal that can be considered the “second Saussurian revolution” and which must be 
interpreted as a rehabilitation of the signifier. In particular, this involves paying special attention 
to the literal nature of texts, subject to a quantitative analysis of the phonic framework of words, 
which seems to evacuate any semantic dimension. F. Bravo’s hypothesis is that Saussure's work 
on anagrams is in fact a means to reproduce, in an experimental way, the conditions of 
emergence of meaning. Moreover, in Saussure’s delinearization of signifiers, F. Bravo 
discovers the premises of a submorphemic approach to language, at the same time a means of 
uncovering the reticular organization of the text and the way of access to the subconscious.  
Other contributions question the status of the signifier and the signified, putting the 
phenomenological dimension of speech at the heart of their reflection. 
Yves MACCHI evokes the well-known paradox of St. Augustine about time to illustrate the 
difficulty experienced by speakers to access the proper meaning of certain words despite their 
mastery of this vocabulary. The ease of use and even the ease of learning among young speakers 
contrast with the difficulty in which the informant is placed when he is put in a situation of 
“giving the meaning” of an isolated word (instruction proposed by the author to his informants). 
And it is that, in fact, the reification of the signifier, considered as an isolated or isolable object 
of which it is a question of restoring a possible “content” of its own, breaks with what are the 
usual conditions of experience of the signifier as a phenomenon: the flow of the sentence. 
Therefore, the author proposes making a clear distinction between the signified as a posterior 
theoretical construction, and signifying, with which it can not be confused, and by which the 
meaning emerges to the consciousness of the speakers and interlocutors when the signifiers are 
apprehended combined with each other in phrases. 
This distinction between signified and signifiance is also proposed by Michaël GRÉGOIRE. The 
author draws on D. Bottineau's approach to rethink the linguistic sign, particularly in order to 
reintroduce a dimension that was forgotten or hidden by structuralism: the corporal dimension 
of language conceived as an activity. He then proposes a synthesis of the biosemiotic literature 
in order to highlight the distinction between “first order” (centered on the activity) and “second 
order” (centered on the meta-observation of this activity, meta-observation creating objects). 
Noting that in the first order, the distinction between signifier and signified appears irrelevant, 
he proposes to substitute for it the unique notion of “signifiance” (signifying). It is in second 
order that the objects “signifier” and “signified” become relevant, and it would probably be 




appropriate to consider them as meta-objects (meta-signifier and meta-signified). Considering 
an utterance a succession of actions in the first order, he proposes the name saillance for some 
of these actions. “Saillance” (saliencing) allow the emergence of semantic effects associated 
with behavioral models that link series of signifiers together. 
In the same way, Marine POIRIER and Didier BOTTINEAU redefine the signifier and speech 
as embodied actions. They show that an utterance, understood as a vocal tirade, is organized, 
during interpretation by a spontaneous analysis. The latter consists of producing unbundlings 
and groupings of segments called “signifiers.” The authors explore a range of linguistic 
productions that are considered deviant from the point of view of academic prescription in the 
segmentation of the signifiers. Through this exploration, the authors bring to light the potential 
effectiveness of these deviances as traces of motivated acts of spontaneous analysis. They also 
show the potential relevance of segments that originate these (re)analyses : namely, « ghost » 
segments superimposed on or interposed between those expected by a conventional analysis. 
The relevance of these segments may depend, in particular, on their inclusion in signifying 
networks of morphemic or sub-morphemic level. The authors’ purpose is to observe how, 
behind the apparent fixity of a symbolic signifier (reified as a stabilized entity), a dia-bolic 
signifier may lurk, resulting from a process of analysis and construction, reconstruction, 
reassembly with variable geometry. 
Régis MISSIRE’s paper also treats a phenomenological problem. He proposes examining what 
happens to semioticity according to the level of language at which it is considered. In his 
framework, he adopts the distinction between system / norm / speech, by studying the forms 
that semiotic relations take at the level of speech (el hablar de Coseriu). In particular, he 
wonders if there are intermediate magnitudes between the “magmatic” psychic flow and the 
discretized and stabilized signs and units. Based on linguistic works inspired by the Gestalt, he 
defends the idea that the level of signifieds and that of signifiers must be analyzed in terms of 
substance and form. The distinction made by R. Missire between theme-forms (per se entities, 
constituents of discourse) and scheme-forms (grammatical schemata but also semic molecules 
that do not necessarily receive a denomination or designation) enables him to identify two types 
of semiosis preferentially attached to the level of concrete speech: the expression, for the 
scheme-forms, and the designation, for the theme-forms. These two semiotic relations are 
added to signifiance (signifying) and signification, which respectively characterize the level of 
the system and that of standards. The paper also emphasizes a dissymmetry in speech: the 
signifier is doomed to fade out, while the signified, which occupies the center of the attentional 
field, is extended. The dissymmetry is repeated at the level of the signified, between the scheme-
forms and the theme-forms. The latter are primarily the object of the attentional focus. 
R. Missire does not, however, neglect the modulations that the various linguistic practices bring 
to this initial disposition of the attention field. 
François NEMO is also interested in the different levels of semiosis. F. Nemo proposes adopting 
a stratified (and plurisemic) conception of the signified. He equally postulates a plurimorphic 
conception of the signifier as a combination of an external form and an internal form. He 
presents a detailed description of the plurisemy on the one hand, and of plurimorphy and 
polymorphy on the other hand, before discussing how the two logics reinforce each other.  Thus, 
he treats the morpheme / lexeme distinction, the plurisemy of lexemes and prosody. He then 
contrasts the nonlinear and archiphonemic nature of the morphemes – which appear mainly as 
thematic indicators – and the linear and phonemic nature of the lexemes. He concludes that 
what ultimately appears to be the most remarkable is that the question of the signifier / signified 
relation and the question of the relation of signs to each other are in fact the same question. 
Finally, two contributions explore the margins of the topic: one is interested in the motivation 
of the sign by showing that it is based on a more general mechanism, not exclusively language, 




that of transmodal correspondences; the other exploits a method resulting from the “linguistics 
of the signifier,” one of the approaches that questions the traditional conception of the sign, and 
puts forward the dynamic and processual dimension of the word. 
Fanny BOUDIER offers a review of literature on phonetic symbolism. The aim is both to give 
access to these works, which are essentially available in English up to now, and to propose a 
synthesis of the phonosymbolic correlations now attested. From F. Boudier’s article, we see 
that these are not solely based on intuition, but on psycholinguistic experiments. To show that 
these correlations between form and meaning exist from a phonosymbolic point of view is to 
move towards a redefinition of the signifier. Indeed, the signifier can no longer be seen as an 
entirely arbitrary object returning by pure convention to a signified, but on the contrary, it must 
be conceived as a materiality evoking the meaning that it contributes to building by its very 
form. 
Through the study of an archaic verb form of Spanish – the subjunctive -re form –, Mary 
Catherine LAVISSIERE treats the articulation between signifier and signified. She questions the 
opinion widely held by many grammarians that different signifiers could be associated with the 
same signified, which would justify recommending the abandonment of forms deemed 
unnecessary. She seeks to bring out the specificity, both from the point of view of the signified 
and from the point of view of discursive uses of this form, a specificity which blocks its 
assimilation with the other forms of subjunctive of Spanish (especially the -se form). To do this, 
she proposes an alternative model of the subjunctive mode, then analyzes the alternation 
between -re and -se forms in conditional subordinates in legal texts. She suggests applying the 
concept of chronosyntax to the legal texts (the sentence is a process, a temporal being) as it was 
conceived and applied by Y. Macchi to poetic texts. This analysis is fruitful because of the 
similarities between the two textual genres (deviation from the “standard” language and 
especially the attention paid to the signifiers). M.C. Lavissière shows that the structuring of 
information in legal texts is based on chronomorphosyntax, which guides the reader through 
the sentence, and even beyond it, through the entire text. 
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